Do Protestant Missionaries Undermine Political Authority? Evidence From Peru by Rink, Anselm
www.ssoar.info
Do Protestant Missionaries Undermine Political
Authority? Evidence From Peru
Rink, Anselm
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung (WZB)
Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz
frei zugänglich. / This publication is with permission of the rights owner freely accessible due to an Alliance licence and
a national licence (funded by the DFG, German Research Foundation) respectively.
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Rink, A. (2018). Do Protestant Missionaries Undermine Political Authority? Evidence From Peru. Comparative political
studies, 51(4), 477-513. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017710260
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer Deposit-Lizenz (Keine
Weiterverbreitung - keine Bearbeitung) zur Verfügung gestellt.
Gewährt wird ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares,
persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für
den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt.
Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments müssen alle
Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen
Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses Dokument
nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie
dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under Deposit Licence (No
Redistribution - no modifications). We grant a non-exclusive, non-
transferable, individual and limited right to using this document.
This document is solely intended for your personal, non-
commercial use. All of the copies of this documents must retain
all copyright information and other information regarding legal
protection. You are not allowed to alter this document in any
way, to copy it for public or commercial purposes, to exhibit the
document in public, to perform, distribute or otherwise use the
document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
econstor
Make Your Publications Visible.
A Service of
zbw Leibniz-InformationszentrumWirtschaftLeibniz Information Centrefor Economics
Rink, Anselm
Article  —  Published Version
Do Protestant Missionaries Undermine Political
Authority? Evidence From Peru
Comparative Political Studies
Provided in Cooperation with:
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
Suggested Citation: Rink, Anselm (2018) : Do Protestant Missionaries Undermine Political
Authority? Evidence From Peru, Comparative Political Studies, ISSN 1552-3829, Sage,
Thousand Oaks, CA, Vol. 51, Iss. 4, pp. 477-513,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0010414017710260
This Version is available at:
http://hdl.handle.net/10419/177384
Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen
Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle
Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich
machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.
Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen
(insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten,
gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort
genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte.
Terms of use:
Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your
personal and scholarly purposes.
You are not to copy documents for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them
publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise
use the documents in public.
If the documents have been made available under an Open
Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you
may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated
licence.
www.econstor.eu
https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017710260
Comparative Political Studies
2018, Vol. 51(4) 477 –513
© The Author(s) 2017
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav 
DOI: 10.1 77/001 41 017 102
journals.sagepub.com/home/cps
Article
Do Protestant 
Missionaries Undermine 
Political Authority? 
Evidence From Peru
Anselm Rink1
Abstract
The relation between religious organizations and political authority is 
notoriously tense. Max Weber argued that this is because both compete 
over the same resource: human commitment. This article revisits Weber’s 
hypothesis. Specifically, we explore two psychological mechanisms through 
which Protestant missionaries affect political authority: obedience and 
persuadability. Exploiting exogenous variation in missionary activity in Peru, 
we demonstrate that missionaries make converts more obedient, which 
we attribute to a theological and a social mechanism. Yet, we also find 
that missionaries make converts less susceptible to persuasion by political 
authorities because they shift attention from secular topics to questions 
of theological importance, and endorse a skeptical stance toward the 
government. Exploiting variation in treatment intensity, we argue that the 
degree to which political authority is affected depends on a given mission’s 
theological strictness. We arrive at these findings by combining experimental 
outcomes and process-tracing evidence using Bayesian integration.
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Do religious organizations undermine political authority? This question argu-
ably lies at the heart of the study of religion and politics (Habermas, 2006; 
Stepan, 2000). As early as 413 CE, Augustine of Hippo argued that the city of 
God stood in irreconcilable conflict with the earthly city. To this day, the rela-
tion between religious organizations and political authority continues to be 
tense (Grzymala-Busse, 2012; March, 2013). According to Max Weber 
(1978), the reason for this rivalry is simple: both spheres compete over the 
same resource, human commitment, and share similar means to gain compli-
ance. Just as political authority rests on the use of physical coercion, religious 
organizations, for Weber, rest on the use of psychic coercion.
Protestants have historically taken a particularly critical stance against polit-
ical authorities. Indeed, the Protestant reformation was partly a product of 
widespread skepticism over close church–state relations (Witte, 2002). In 
today’s world, Protestants are known as strong critics of political authority—a 
phenomenon particularly visible in developing countries (Freston, 2008; 
Marshall, 2009). At the same time, scholars have highlighted Protestantism’s 
historic role in advancing democracy (Woodberry, 2012). Political stability and 
accountability, too, tend to cluster in countries with high shares of Protestants 
(Tusalem, 2009).
Many scholars contend that the mechanisms underlying these associations 
operate at the structural level. Woodberry (2012), for example, argues that 
Protestant missionaries foster democracy by establishing a civil society, sup-
plying printing resources, and providing education. Others underscore the 
role of missionaries in advancing economic growth, which in turn correlates 
with democratic consolidation (Barro, 1999; Blum & Dudley, 2001). 
However, religious organizations also exhibit effects at the individual-cogni-
tive level (McClendon & Riedl, 2015; Wulff, 1991). Religious organizations 
shape how individuals relate to authority figures (Purzycki et al., 2016). They 
also affect what topics believers take interest in (Tirole & Bénabou, 2006).
This article reconsiders the contested relation between Protestantism and 
political authority. We depart from more structurally framed accounts by hon-
ing in on the psychological mechanisms through which missionaries may 
impact political authorities at the local level. In particular, we explore to what 
degree Protestant missionaries affect two essential determinants of effective 
authority: obedience and persuadability (Weber, 2009). On one hand, 
Protestant missionaries expose converts to highly charismatic preachers and 
demand submission to God’s commands (Reuschling, 2005), which propels 
obedience. On the other hand, Protestant missionaries rigorously focus on 
questions of theological importance and are skeptical of state authorities 
(Casanova, 2011). This, in turn, reduces political authorities’ leeway to per-
suade converts regarding topics of secular interest. The effect of Protestant 
missionaries on political authority is thus ambiguous.
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We test these hypotheses using evidence from agrarian villages in south-
eastern Peru. We document near-exogenous variation in missionary activity 
that exposed villages to two types of missions, Evangelical and Pentecostal, 
which we compare with control communities, which were not evangelized 
and remained nominally Catholic. Using structured surveys and experiments, 
we confirm that both types of Protestant missionaries increase obedience to 
authority, while also undermining persuadability with regard to secular top-
ics. We solidify these findings by integrating quantitative with process-trac-
ing evidence.
Importantly, we demonstrate that our findings are driven by theological, 
not structural, mechanisms: The effects are particularly pronounced among 
villages exposed to Pentecostal missions. These missions differ from their 
Evangelical counterparts primarily with regard to the intensity of their reli-
gious preaching. Services are excessively long and use manifold charismatic 
elements like speaking in tongues and divine healings. Preachers demand 
strict obedience to God, and shift converts’ attention toward the afterlife. Our 
study thus adds to recent advances in the study of Pentecostalism (Grossman, 
2015; Sperber, 2014).
This article makes three contributions to the literature on religion and poli-
tics. First, we bring new theoretical considerations and empirical evidence to 
the century-old question whether religious organizations undermine political 
authority. Our hypotheses predict that Protestant missionaries affect authority 
via two psychological mechanisms—obedience and persuadability—which 
counteract each other. Second, we present new measurement strategies for 
these concepts that have heretofore been confined to laboratory settings. 
Third, we offer the first quasi-experimental analysis of missionaries, which 
integrates qualitative and quantitative evidence in a Bayesian framework.
Protestant Missionaries and Political Authority
“Authority,” writes Sebastian De Grazia (1959), “is a subject indispensable to 
politics” (p. 321). Effective governance—be it in a democratic or authoritar-
ian system—rests on assertive and persuasive authority figures. Political 
authority, however, is inherently unstable. At the individual level, citizens 
may fail to comply with political authority. At the societal level, rival politi-
cal groups challenge those in power. A particularly stark symbol of a govern-
ment’s difficulty in securing its authority is religious organizations. Indeed, 
Max Weber, in his book Economy and Society, argues that religious and polit-
ical organizations are bound to be in conflict as both organizations predomi-
nantly focus on securing human commitment.
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The tense relation between religious groups and state authorities is evi-
denced in countless historic accounts (e.g., Philpott, 2007, p. 506). Political 
theorists, too, have explored the tense relationship between religion and state 
authorities.1 The rivalry has also generated a significant body of empirical 
work. Several scholars have assessed how religious organizations may 
weaken state authorities. Berman (2000), for instance, argues that religious 
organizations operate as clubs that provide insurance to members. Such clubs 
render state provision of resources less pivotal (see also Huber & Stanig, 
2011). Yet, the interaction between religious and political organizations has 
also been described in more positive terms (Nasr, 2001; Woodberry, 2012).
However, current research on the relation between religious groups and 
political authorities suffers from two shortcomings. First, empirical studies 
have been largely observational and have thus failed to establish causal rela-
tionships between religious organizations and political authority. Second, 
theoretical accounts have not sufficiently explored the psychological mecha-
nisms through which religious groups affect political authority. In fact, the 
psychological repercussions of religious organizations have received almost 
no attention in political science (McClendon & Riedl, 2015). This is despite 
a generally burgeoning interest in political authority.2
Defining Political Authority
Before exploring the psychological mechanisms through which Protestant 
missionaries may affect the relationship between individuals and state author-
ity, we first outline this article’s definition of political authority. In the inter-
est of simplicity, we adopt Max Weber’s seminal definition. Weber 
distinguishes between authority/power (Macht) and leadership (Herrschaft). 
In this article, we focus entirely on the former concept.
In its most minimal form, Weber (2009) defines authority as “the chance 
of obtaining the obedience of others to a particular command” (p. 54). 
However, Weber explicitly states that authority relies on more than obedi-
ence. It depends on “a certain minimum of voluntary submission” (Weber, 
2009, p. 324). Thus, as Blau (1963) notes, Weber distinguishes between two 
basic determinants of authority: domination that rests on the power to com-
mand, and domination that rests on the ability to influence. In addition to 
obedience, effective state authority must therefore count on the persuadabil-
ity of its citizens.
How do religious groups, and Protestant missionaries in particular, affect the 
two individual-level psychological determinants of effective authority? In the 
following, we present theoretical considerations of how missionaries may affect 
obedience and persuadability. We condense our theoretical considerations using 
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a directed acyclic graph (DAG) displayed in Figure 1, which depicts our argu-
ments without making assumptions about the distribution of variables, the func-
tional form, or the magnitude of effects (Elwert, 2013; Pearl, 1995).
Obedience
Obedience describes the behavior of yielding to commands from authority. It 
is, as Stanley Milgram (1974) writes, “the psychological mechanism that 
links individual action to political purpose” (p. 1). As such, obedience is a 
key element of effective governance. Dalton (2008) notes, “even democratic 
governments emphasize the role of the loyal law-abiding individual as a 
prime criterion of citizenship” (p. 79). Without obedience, states cannot claim 
a monopoly of power (Weber, 2009).
Importantly, obedience is also a concept at the core of Christianity. The 
New Testament includes numerous passages that demand obedience toward 
God and worldly leaders. The apostle Paul, for instance, states, “everyone 
must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority 
except that which God has established” (Rom. 13:1-2). Similarly, in Peter 
2:13-14, it is written “[s]ubmit yourselves for the Lords sake to every human 
authority: whether to the emperor, as the supreme authority, or to governors, 
who are sent by him to punish those who do wrong and to commend those who 
do right.” The importance of obedience was clear to the missionaries of Latin 
America, too. In 1553, Ignatius of Loyola told the Jesuit missionaries: “I 
desire that you, in more than any other virtue, excel especially in obedience.”
Protestant missionaries arguably have a particularly close relation to obe-
dience. In a speech given at the World Mission Conference in 1964, William 
Crane (1965) reminded his fellow practitioners that “obedience requires 
meaningful Christian presence in the world where our Lord sends us” (p. 
331). Reuschling (2005) argues that this focus on obedience is due to 
Figure 1. Directed acyclic graph of theoretical model.
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missionaries’ focus on the supernatural, and their reliance on charismatic 
leaders. Both phenomena give rise to two submechanisms: a theological and 
social mechanism, which we discuss in turn.
First, Protestant missionaries theologically instruct converts that obedi-
ence to God is an essential virtue for Christians. Gill (2004), for example, 
observes, “Protestantism (and in particular Pentecostalism) favours direct 
connections with God” (p. 3). As a consequence, notes Reuschling (2005), 
there is a strong “experiential component in how Evangelicalism is defined 
with regard to one’s personal acceptance of . . . Jesus Christ” (p. 61). Max 
Weber (1978), too, highlights that “Protestantism (teaches) the principle of 
loyal fulfillment of obligations” (p. 544). Martin Luther—the seminal figure 
of the Protestant reformation—too, placed great emphasis on obedience. In 
his early work Von Weltlicher Obrigkeit, Wie Weit Man Ihr Gehorsam 
Schuldig Sei, Luther (1967), citing Peter (2:13-14), demands that “At first, 
we must establish the primacy of secular law and the sword” (p. 7).3 Taken 
together, there are thus strong theological reasons for Protestant missionaries 
to instruct converts to obey the supernatural (Gill, 1994). Our own qualitative 
interviews, discussed below, buttress this argument.
Second, Protestant missionaries socially accustom converts to authority 
figures. Protestant missionaries have a particular tendency to rely on charis-
matic local leaders, often labeled “religious entrepreneurs.” Branded, among 
other things, as “benign and principled crusaders” (Lankina & Getachew, 
2013, p. 103), they rely on strong personalities to spread the gospel. These 
leaders, as Reuschling (2005) notes, “have positional power as a result of 
their status, both assigned and ascribed, in evangelical organizations and 
churches” (p. 65). Protestant leaders construct power by being supreme inter-
preters of the Bible. This setup, thus, fosters a habit among converts to obey 
authority figures. Max Weber, too, noted this phenomenon early on. He 
writes, “preaching achieves the greatest significance in Protestantism, in 
which the concept of the priest has been supplanted altogether by that of the 
preacher” (Weber, 1978, p. 464). Again, Pentecostals have a particular ten-
dency to rely on charismatic leaders given their theological strictness and 
high levels of charismaticism (Anderson, 2013; Meyer, 2004).
Both arguments give rise to our main obedience hypothesis (H1), namely, 
that Protestant missionaries increase obedience to authority figures among 
converts. But, to what extent are these mechanisms exclusively a result of 
Protestant proselytism? Both the theological and social mechanism could 
arguably be activated by alternative missionaries or other organized groups. 
Regarding the theological mechanism, several scholars have noted that 
Islamic proselytism (Dawah), too, places a strong theological emphasis on 
obedience to God. For example, Poston (1992) writes, “[t]he starting point 
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and core of da’wah consists of . . . obedience to the Messages of God” (pp. 
84-85). Regarding the social mechanism, psychologists have long argued that 
submission to authority can be activated by manifold social groups, notably, 
when political leaders are perceived as legitimate (Cialdini & Goldstein, 
2004; Tyler, 1997, 2006). For instance, Baldassarri and Grossman (2011) find 
that Ugandan farmers are more likely to cooperate when exposed to leaders 
with centralized sanctioning powers (see also De Kwaadsteniet & Van Dijk, 
2010). Relatedly, one may argue that the Catholic Church, given its hierarchi-
cal structuring, also fosters obedience to authority.
These considerations underline that our arguments are not exclusive char-
acteristics of Protestant missionaries. Other groups may also increase obedi-
ence. Notwithstanding, our research design, which compares Protestant 
missionary groups of differing theological strictness, allows us to assess 
whether the theological mechanisms exerts a causal role. Specifically, we 
should expect to see greater effect sizes among Pentecostal missionaries if 
the theological mechanism is to carry any weight, which forms the basis for 
our second hypothesis (H2). As such, our arguments highlight that the con-
tent of religion, too, affects obedience, not merely its social structure. Finally, 
we should note that the above arguments are predominantly with regard to 
religious authorities (the supernatural or preachers). One should therefore 
expect possible increases in obedience to be predominantly with respect to 
religious authority figures. Still, given that obedience is a general personal 
trait and given that this article explores the relation between missionaries and 
political authority, we also hypothesize that the effect spills over to political 
authorities, which gives rise to our third hypothesis (H3).
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Protestant missionaries increase individuals’ obedi-
ence to authority in villages where they evangelize as compared with vil-
lages where they do not evangelize.
Hypothesis 2 (H2): Protestant missionaries increase individuals’ obedi-
ence to religious authorities more so than individuals’ obedience to politi-
cal authorities.
Hypothesis 3 (H3): Pentecostal missionaries increase individuals’ obedi-
ence to authority more so than mainline Evangelical missionaries.
Persuasion
Persuasion is a process aimed at changing a person’s attitude, behavior, or belief. 
As such, persuasion, write Cobb and Kuklinski (1997), is the “the crux of poli-
tics” (p. 88). Countless theoretical studies attest to the fact that persuasion is a 
core tool for political authorities (Garsten, 2009; Sniderman, Brody, & Tetlock, 
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1993; Zaller, 1992). Given that citizens cannot know everything, yet have to 
vote authorities into office, “knowledge of the summum bonum . . . must be 
wedded to political persuasion” (Mayo, 1962, p. 561). Indeed, Weber (2009) 
argues that political authority is toothless without persuasion.
Importantly, the manner in which political authorities can persuade citi-
zens may be compromised by religious groups. Religious groups not only use 
persuasion themselves,4 but they also provide conceptions of the common 
good, thereby affecting which topics are discussed in the political arena 
(Audi, 2000). If a given religion takes little interest in secular issues, political 
authority may find its persuasive efforts on secular grounds futile. Thus, 
notes Habermas (2006), political authority can only hope that “religious citi-
zens . . . develop an epistemic stance toward the priority that secular reasons 
enjoy in the political arena” (p. 14).
Protestant missionaries, however, likely diminish the hopes of secular 
authorities to persuade religious converts. Two factors are responsible for 
this: missionaries’ skepticism toward secular authorities, and their focus on 
theological concepts (sola fide). Both phenomena give rise to two submecha-
nisms by which Protestant missionaries reduce persuadability: cognitive dis-
sonance and intellectual substitution. They are discussed in turn.
First, Protestant missionaries reduce converts’ persuadability by creating 
cognitive dissonance, which they induce by propagating other-worldly beliefs 
that may be at odds with statements of political authorities and by endorsing 
a generally skeptical attitude toward political authorities (Casanova, 2011). 
Indeed, Ireland (1993) notes that the “prevailing stereotype of Pentecostal 
crentes is that they are apolitical conservatives who leave the injustices of the 
world to the Lord’s care” (p. 4). There is little doubt, as Gill (2001) argues, 
that “Latin American Protestantism has not shown the political activism of 
other fundamentalisms” (p. 129). As such, Protestant missionaries may create 
cognitive dissonance by pitting converts against secular authorities. Examples 
abound from several anthropological accounts. In one study about a different 
set of communities in the Peruvian Andes, the author notes that Protestant 
missionaries believe that “events in society are to be judged and interpreted 
through the Bible” not through political leaders (Olson, 2006, p. 890). In our 
own qualitative interviews (discussed below), local experts stated that the 
relation between village presidents and Protestant converts was strenuous, 
often shaped by conflicting viewpoints about the common good. When asked 
to describe the relationship on a scale from 1 (very bad) to 10 (very good), 
experts responded with a low average of 3.0 in Evangelical and 2.1 in 
Pentecostal villages.
Second, Protestant missionaries reduce converts’ persuadability by foster-
ing intellectual substitution, which they induce by shifting attention from 
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secular topics to questions of theological importance (Deiros, 1991). 
Protestant missionaries are known to propagate that the scripture is adequate 
for addressing all issues of life, claiming a “self-sufficiency of the bible” 
(Birch, Rasmussen, & Wogaman, 1989, p. 152). Webber (1978) argues that 
this focus on scripture is the quintessence of Protestantism, that is, “deep 
conviction that faith in Jesus Christ . . . produces life-changing effects” 
(p. 17). Martin Luther, too, demanded such a focus on sola fide (belief alone), 
which broadly sets Protestants apart from other religions, particularly 
Catholics. Specifically, Luther, referring to Romans 3: 21-28, argued that 
God’s pardon for sinners is received through faith alone. Consequently, 
Protestant missionaries preach that belief alone (sola fide) is the answer to 
worldly matters (Garrard-Burnett & Stoll, 1993). In contrast to the Catholic 
Church, which focuses on this-worldly matters, Protestant missionaries 
replace secular topics with theology.
Both arguments give rise to our main persuasion hypothesis (H4), namely, 
that Protestant missionaries reduce converts’ persuadability with regard to 
topics of secular importance. Again, one may justly ask whether these effects 
are an exclusive product of Protestant missionaries. After all, some strands of 
Protestantism, particularly in England, rejected the notion of sola fide (Baker, 
1985). As such, it is important to reiterate that the arguments rely on a proba-
bilistic logic. Once again, however, the mechanisms predict effect sizes to be 
particularly pronounced among Pentecostals, which forms the basis for our 
fifth hypothesis (H5).
Hypothesis 4 (H4): Protestant missionaries reduce individuals’ persuad-
ability to political authorities in villages where they evangelize as com-
pared with villages where they do not evangelize.
Hypothesis 5 (H5): Pentecostal missionaries reduce individuals’ per-
suadability to political authorities more so than mainline Evangelical 
missionaries.
Empirical Design
Testing hypotheses about the effects of Protestant missionaries on political 
authority requires a causally identified research design. Most studies on the 
effects of missionaries, thus far, have used observational evidence. Such data, 
though historically extensive, may fall victim to unobserved confounding. 
Notably, Protestant missions have historically clustered in colonized areas, 
which differ from noncolonized areas in several ways of which some are dif-
ficult to observe. This article circumvents the problem of unobserved con-
founding by exploiting exogenous variation in missionary activity, which 
took place in the Peruvian Andes in the late 1980s.
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The Shining Path and Protestant Missionaries
The rise and fall of the guerrilla movement Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso) 
afforded temporal variation in the exposure of communities in southeastern 
Peru to Protestant missions. The Shining Path, an offshoot of the Communist 
Party of Peru, was founded in the late 1960s. The group fought against Peru’s 
supposedly bourgeois democracy. Its goal was to implement a dictatorship of 
the proletariat (Stern, 1998). To do so, in 1980, the group formed a “revolu-
tionary directorate.” The subsequent burning of ballot boxes during the dem-
ocratic election marked the inception of a violent insurgency.
In the following years, the group made significant territorial advances. 
The rebels gained support from peasants, particularly in economically disad-
vantaged regions of Peru’s central provinces. Initially, government response 
to the uprising was limited, which allowed the Shining Path to steadily 
increase its influence (Switzer, 1993). By 1990, the group had gained control 
over large areas of Peru’s central and southern districts. The capture of its 
leader, Abimael Guzmán, in 1992 marked the beginning of the groups’ grad-
ual decline, exacerbated by increasing military action from the Peruvian 
government.
In contrast to the rise of Evangelical proselytism across South America in 
the 1970s and 1980s, the Shining Path marked a hindrance to Protestant mis-
sionaries in several regions of Peru. While the interaction between the rebels 
and missionaries has received little scholarly attention (Ferguson (2005, p. 
248), most existing accounts highlight the hostile relationship between the 
two groups. One account by del Pino (1996) points out that in the Apurimac 
region—the bordering region of this article’s sample—Pentecostals viewed 
the Sendero as “demons,” and took up arms to fight them. In a more system-
atic overview, Klaiber (1988) documents systematic Protestant victimization 
by rebel and counterinsurgency forces. According to Strong (1992), this vic-
timization was inevitable because the Evangelicals, too, aspired to be the 
leaders of the peasant class.
Vivid accounts are also found among Latin American theologians. Escobar 
(1986) writes,
The militants of Sendero have . . . been ruthless in their effort to eliminate any 
opposition in the areas that came under their control. Hundreds of policemen 
and peasants have been killed in cruel spectacular ways by the terrorists. 
Evangelical pastors and lay leaders who were perceived as ideological enemies 
were also killed mercilessly. (p. 10)
Protestant missionaries were, indeed, a prime target of the rebels; several 
leading figures were killed (Cadorette, 1994). Switzer (1993) recounts a par-
ticularly gruesome attack:
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In response to increased foreign presence, Sendero Luminoso stepped up its 
violence against foreigners. In August 1990, for example, it attacked and killed 
two Mormon missionaries near Huancayo. A handwritten note left near the 
bodies demanded that all “Yankee invaders” leave Peru. (p. 61)
While the Cusco region—the case study of this article—was only mildly 
affected by the insurgency, it, too, witnessed less missionary activity than 
was common in counties not bordering the rebel’s territory.
It was not until the capture of Guzmán that missionaries rediscovered the 
region as an area for proselytism. Once the area was considered safe, several 
Protestant churches embarked on a race to bring the gospel to the communi-
ties, which, at that point in time, were nominally Catholic. This Catholicism, 
however, was dormant. The missionary hectic was particularly prevalent in 
villages near the city of Cusco. Road access was decent, and villagers knew 
enough Spanish to attend services. The hectic created a situation where 
church planting followed no discernible strategy; conversion was pursued 
independent of village characteristics. Just as important, the missionary race 
also left some communities untreated, which serve as the control category in 
this article.
Interviews conducted by the authors with local and international mission-
aries in the region confirm the random and hectic nature of the church plant-
ing. A Baptist missionary from the United States conveyed to the authors that 
“missionaries trickled in and picked communities in an arbitrary manner.” In 
a similar vein, a minister of the Seventh Day Adventist church stated that 
Protestant missionaries “chose the ones [villages] no one had gone to as 
quickly as they could.” When asked why a Pentecostal church had picked one 
particular village, a Catholic nun replied, “The missionaries are only driven 
by the holy spirit.”
In addition to conducting statistical tests that underline the exogeneity of 
the process, we conducted structured interviews with church officials and 
village presidents in all communities studied in this article. These interviews, 
which are presented in detail below, yield two important pieces of informa-
tion regarding the church planting process.
First, to understand whether missionaries followed a specific strategy 
when selecting villages, we asked the following open-ended question to the 
church officials: “Why did you set up the church in this village?” Buttressing 
our argument that villages were treated independent of village characteristics, 
no church official listed a concrete example why a given village had been 
chosen. Two officials could not think of a reason, four said that the village 
simply had had no mission, four stated that other missions were too far away 
for individuals to go to, and five mentioned abstract reason of the form, “it is 
necessary to be in all parts where God is.”5
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Second, to understand whether the treatment was exclusive, we asked vil-
lage presidents whether there had ever been another mission: “Have there 
ever been other missions present in this village?” Fifteen out of 16 presidents 
said no. One president claimed that a mission had been present, but had dis-
continued its operation after a few months. In addition, all officials negated 
the question “Have there ever been other missionaries present trying to con-
vert people.” The assignment of the missions can therefore be viewed as 
exclusive, which allows us to attribute observed differences across villages to 
the Protestant missions.
Sample
The overall population of interest consist of the Agrarian communities in the 
state of Cusco in southeastern Peru. The sample in this study includes 16 vil-
lages, which were carefully selected from over 50 communities so as to guar-
antee isomorphic pretreatment conditions. Specifically, selection of villages 
followed two main criteria. First, we chose communities that are similar 
regarding observed pretreatment covariates, including geographic, linguistic, 
and agricultural characteristics. Second, we chose communities large enough 
to allow random sampling of at least 64 respondents, a size necessary to 
administer several randomized instruments. The sample sites are reported in 
Figure 6 in the supplementary material. We should also point out that 16 vil-
lages is a rather low number of clusters, which puts statistical power at risk. 
Yet, the case at hand did not allow for selecting more than 16 villages, given 
our strict sampling procedure and the historic setup. For this reason, we opted 
to buttressing any observed differences across the villages using qualitative 
interviews.
Treatment
The final set of 16 villages includes five conceptually different treatments 
reported in Table 1. First, the Control treatment depicts villages that never 
received a mission. Akin to all communities in the sample, the villages in this 
category have old Catholic Church buildings that are no longer in use. The 
reasons for the Catholic Church’s gradual decline in the communities under 
study are manifold. They range from poor central planning, limited resources, 
to recruitment shortages.6 Control villagers, all of which still identify as 
Catholic,7 sometimes visit Catholic parishes in cities where services are still 
offered. The Control communities thus serve as our counterfactual. They 
allow us to understand what evangelized villages would look like today had 
they not been exposed to Protestant missionaries. The reasons why these 
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villages never received a mission are unclear. In qualitative interviews, the 
author could not obtain a satisfactory answer from village presidents and 
church officials. Suffice it to say that the Control villages are statistically 
indistinguishable from the proselytized villages (see “Balance” section).
The Adventist treatment depicts villages where the mainline Evangelical 
Seventh Day Adventist church set up missions. These villages are exposed to 
rather mild forms of Evangelical theology. Church services are socially con-
sidered mandatory, but the sermons are shaped by a somewhat more critical 
engagement with the scripture. Speaking in tongues and other charismatic 
practices are largely absent.8 Adventist villages are also shaped by more out-
going and politically active church leaders who take an active interest in their 
communities.
The Peruana treatment depicts villages that were exposed to a Peruvian 
Pentecostal church, called Iglesia Evangélica Peruana. Spirituality in the 
Peruana church is noticeably more pronounced. Church services include 
charismatic elements like speaking in tongues and divine healing. The 
Peruana church is a strongly biblical church. As Olson (2006, p. 890) writes, 
“IEP follows the ‘biblical Christianity’ commonly associated with Evangelical 
Christian churches in the United States and other Evangelical churches of 
Latin America” (see also Barreda, 1993). In comparison with Adventists, 
Peruana services are also significantly longer, and regularly last for more 
than 3 hours Church leaders are less politically active and demand strict obe-
dience to the scripture and an active engagement with the church. As such, 
the Peruana prizes “personal relationships with God through the ‘Word’ as 
put forth in the Bible” and “events in society are to be judged and interpreted 
through the Bible” (Olson, 2006, p. 890).
The Maranatha treatment depicts villages that received a mission post 
from a Pentecostal church called Iglesia Cristiana Maranatha. The church 
Table 1. Treatments.
Treatment Compliance (%) n Theology
Control 95.8 192 Limited exposure to Catholic gospel
Adventists 51.0 192 Limited spirituality, no speaking in 
tongues, shorter service
Peruana 57.3 192 High spirituality, some speaking in 
tongues, long service
Maranatha 49.6 256 High spirituality, speaking in 
tongues, very long service
Mixed 57.3 192 Combination of the above
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labels itself as charismatic. Church services are exceedingly long and include 
manifold charismatic elements such as widespread use of speaking in tongues, 
shared crying of the congregation, divine healing, and divine revelations. 
Church leaders and ministers in the Peruana church are even less concerned 
with secular issues as compared with the Peruana church. In contrast to all 
other churches, interview requests by the authors were met with skepticism, 
and regularly denied.
Finally, the Mixed treatment category includes villages that received sev-
eral Evangelical missions, all of which are either Adventists, Maranatha, or 
Peruana missions.9 The treatment strength (i.e., the intensity of the Evangelical 
preaching) therefore ranges somewhere in the middle.
In Table 1, we summarize the five treatment statuses. As can be seen in 
column 2, compliance rates—villagers reporting to belong to the church—is 
around 50%. The third column states how many individuals were sampled in 
each treatment category. Table 7 in the supplementary material gives a more 
comprehensive overview of the sample’s treatment status and religious 
affiliation.
Sampling Strategy
In addition to qualitative surveys, we administered a large-scale structured 
survey in all 16 villages, enrolling 64 subjects per village. To do so, the author 
visited each of the 16 villages prior to surveying and obtained consent from 
village presidents. In 12 villages, the author presented the work in front of the 
village assembly. In the remaining four villages, the presidents informed vil-
lagers that surveying would take place. The author was assisted by 21 local 
Master’s students who were carefully selected from a pool of 50, and were 
covered under Columbia University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB).
The entire sample includes 1,024 respondents. In all, 1.3% of all outcome 
measures are missing. In additional analyses, available upon request, we 
show that attrition is independent of treatment status. To ensure as representa-
tive a sample of the villages as possible, the sampling employed two levels of 
randomization. First, all 64 respondents per village were sampled using a 
random-walk procedure.10 Second, enumerators were randomly assigned to 
villages and to each block within a village to avoid enumerator effects.
Surveys were conducted in the late afternoons and at night to maximize 
participation. Although very time-consuming, sampling during the day was 
not possible as most villagers take their cattle to the fields. Nonparticipation 
was at 7.8%. Failure to participate was largely due to respondents’ time con-
straints. Given the small size of the villages (an average of 68 families), the 
vast majority of eligible respondents was sampled. Respondents were paid 5 
Peruvian Sols (US$1.75)—about a day’s earnings.
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Balance
Our key identifying assumption is that assignment to treatment was indepen-
dent of potential outcomes. We took several steps to buttress this assumption 
empirically.
First, we gained access to the Peruvian census from 1993. The data, thus, 
fall broadly within the period when the missionaries began their conversion 
in the communities. The census includes data on 91 variables including indi-
cators on education, demographics, and economic development. We report 
these data in Table 10 in the supplementary material. To assess balance across 
the different treatment statuses as compared with the control villages, in 
Figure 2, we plot absolute t values assessing differences-in-means across the 
Figure 2. Balance across treatment statuses.
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five treatment statues and the nontreated control villages. As can be seen, the 
vast majority of variables are not significantly different. Indeed, only three 
variables are consistently different in the treatment villages, namely, indi-
viduals between 1 and 4 years of age, married individuals, and individuals 
living together. The low incidence of systematic pretreatment differences on 
a host of administrative variables, thus, buttresses our key identifying 
assumption.
Second, we gathered additional information on pretreatment variables in 
semistructured qualitative interviews with history experts in each village. 
These individuals were recommended to us by village presidents. We asked 
these individuals to think back to the year 1992 and asked them whether their 
village, at the time, had had a school, hospital, post station, or football field. 
We report these variables in Table 10 in the supplementary material. To 
ensure that the experts recalled the correct villages, we reminded them that 
the year 1992 was the year prior to the census, which all experts recalled. 
These variables, too, confirm that the villages were broadly similar pretreat-
ment. None of the villages had schools, hospitals, or post stations, except for 
one village in the Peruana treatment category. Football fields were more 
widespread at the time, ranging from 33% in the untreated control villages to 
100% in the Peruana villages. Importantly, all villages confirmed that the 
Shining Path had been active in the village in the 1980s. These data, then, 
provide additional qualitative evidence regarding pretreatment balance.
Third, we collected five geographic variables from all villages. We 
recorded a given village’s road and geodesic distance to Cusco (in km) as 
well as a given village’s elevation and its longitude and latitude. These data 
are reported in Table 9 in the supplementary material and offer an objective 
way to assess balance given that the data cannot be affected by the treatment. 
The table underlines that there are no apparent imbalances between treatment 
and control villages. On average, distance to Cusco is 22 km in Control vil-
lages as compared with 28 km in Adventist and Mixed villages, 34 km in 
Peruana villages, and 17 km in Maranatha villages. Elevation is roughly 
12,000 feet in all villages, except for the Peruana villages (13,000 feet).
Last, we can scrutinize balance across treatment and control villages in 
our random population sample. The sample’s individual-level variables are 
reported in Table 8 in the supplementary information. Many of these vari-
ables could plausibly be affected by the treatment (e.g., education, income, 
relationship status, professions, and propensity to travel). The variables that 
cannot be affected by the treatment, however, are perfectly balanced across 
the treatment statuses. In particular, the average age is 41 years in Control 
villages, 39 years in Adventist villages, 40 in Mixed villages, 37 in Peruana 
villages, and 38 in Maranatha villages. Gender, too, is perfectly balanced. 
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Finally, 5% of residents in Control villages have Internet access compared 
with 8% in Adventist villages, 3% in Mixed villages, 5% in Peruana villages, 
and 2% in Maranatha villages.
Taken together, we interpret the balance across a host of pretreatment vari-
ables—census data, expert interviews, geographic data, and the population 
survey—in favor of our key assumption, namely, that missionaries visited 
communities independent of potential outcomes. We should also highlight 
that the few variables that do exhibit imbalance (notably, marital status, and 
individuals between 1 and 4 years of age) are unlikely to explain diverging 
levels of persuadability and obedience.
Measurement
We use experimental and attitudinal evidence to test the degree to which 
Protestant missionaries affect obedience and persuadability, which we outline 
in turn.
We experimentally tested obedience using a novel lab-in-the-field experi-
ment. Since Milgram’s (1974) pioneering research, experiments of obedience 
have been scarce. We therefore developed a new obedience experiment, 
aimed at seamless implementation during the survey. In particular, before 
commencing the surveys, research assistants obtained statements from local 
church and state authorities, in which they insisted that surveys were to be 
conducted in public places for security reasons. At a random point during the 
survey,11 enumerators were instructed to state the following sentence: “As a 
matter of fact, [church/state] authorities have demanded that we conduct this 
survey in a public place. Should we move? We are happy to do it at either 
place.” All endorsements, including those listed below, were fully factorially 
randomized within a given village level. As enumerators were instructed to 
commence the surveys in private homes, the statement placed respondents in 
a realistic dilemma. Respondents had to decide whether to follow the com-
mand from the respective authority and thus suffer the nuisance of relocating. 
After answering the question, the enumerators recorded whether subjects, 
indeed, followed the authority’s request. As the left column in Table 2 dem-
onstrates, the experiment worked well, inducing pronounced variation among 
participants. In all, 26% of subjects followed the command from the respec-
tive authority.
In addition to the experimental measure, we assessed obedience using one 
attitudinal measure. Specifically, we asked subjects whether they would 
accept wrongdoings of [church/state] authorities: “Would it be OK for you if 
you knew a [church/village] authority was doing something dubious?” As the 
right column in Table 2 shows, a surprising 23% of individuals stated they 
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would tolerate wrongdoings of the respective authority figure. The number 
buttresses the findings from the behavioral experiment.
We experimentally tested persuadability by implementing a persuasion 
experiment. To do so, we built a typical persuasion experiment, in which we 
measured an attitude, intervened with new conflicting evidence, and then 
remeasured the attitude at a later point (Redlawsk, 2002; Taber, Cann, & 
Kucsova, 2009). In particular, we asked respondents at an early point during 
the survey whether they would like social spending in Peru to increase: “Do 
you want social spending to be higher in Peru (e.g., health, education)?” 
Depending on the answer, respondents were then given a newspaper article in 
which church/state authorities expressed the opposite opinion, namely, that 
social spending was too high/low. The newspaper articles were taken from 
international media, as relevant accounts were not available for Peru. For 
example, a respondent that deemed spending too low was read the following 
script: “I have here a newspaper article. It shows that a [state/church] author-
ity believes that social spending is too high and that this is not good for the 
economy.” The goal of the statement was to expose respondents to conflict-
ing evidence delivered by an authority figure. At a later point in the survey, 
respondents were then asked the same initial question, and enumerators noted 
whether subjects had changed their mind as a result of the persuasive effort 
by the authority figure. As Table 3 shows, 9% of respondents were persuaded 
to an alternate opinion. It is worth pointing out that the experiment was unob-
trusive in nature, and the persuasive effort rather mild.
Table 3. Persuasion—Aggregate Experimental and Attitudinal Results.
Behavioral Attitudinal I Attitudinal II
 
Persuaded by 
authority?
Deems state 
projects important?
Deems village 
projects important?
Yes 9.2% 37.2% 39.2%
No 90.8% 62.8% 60.8%
Table 2. Obedience—Average Experimental and Attitudinal Results.
Behavioral Attitudinal
 Obeyed order from authority? Accepts wrongdoing by authority?
Yes 26.0% 22.5%
No 74.0% 77.5%
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In addition, we assessed persuadability using two attitudinal measures. 
First, we asked subjects an open-ended question regarding possible infra-
structure projects they would like state authorities to implement: “Which 
projects would you like state authorities to implement?” Subjects were then 
given four projects (hospital, school, roads, and water), and enumerators 
noted which projects the respondents deemed important. The question, thus, 
aimed at measuring the degree to which subjects take an interest in secular 
issues. The average affirmation for the projects was (Table 3) was 37%. 
Second, enumerators inquired about projects that subjects deemed worthy of 
implementation at the village level: “What is the most important thing this 
town needs to improve?” Here, too, subjects were given a list of five projects 
(health, education, trust, water, and the church), and enumerators noted how 
many were affirmed. On average, 39% of projects were affirmed.
Results
In estimating the degree to which Protestant missionaries affect obedience 
and persuadability, we analyze the intention-to-treat effect at the village level. 
Our primary linear model—estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS)—is 
as follows:
Yil il il il il= 0 1 2 3 4β β β β β+ + + + +Adventist Mixed Peruana Maranatha Xil ilβ+∈ , (1)
where Yil  represents the outcome of individual i  in village l , Adventist, 
Mixed, Peruana, and Maranatha represent dummies for the respective treat-
ment statuses, and Xil  represents a vector of individual-level and commu-
nity-level control variables.
Given the large number of possibly prognostic control variables, there is 
significant discretion over which variables to include in our models. We there-
fore focus on variables entirely unaffected by the treatment. At the individual 
level (Table 8 in the supplementary material), this includes age and gender. At 
the village level (Tables 9-10 in the supplementary material), this includes all 
geographic variables (i.e., road and geodesic distance to Cusco, elevation, lon-
gitude, and latitude). In addition, it includes historic pretreatment variables 
drawn from interviews with history experts (i.e., whether a village had a 
school, hospital, post station, and football field in 1992, and whether the 
Sendero Luminoso was active in the village). Finally, it includes all census 
variables listed in Table 10 in the supplementary material. Overall, there are, 
thus, well over 100 possible pretreatment covariates at our disposal. To mini-
mize “researchers degrees of freedom” when determining the prognostic value 
of covariates and to avoid multicollinearity, we therefore report models 
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without covariate adjustment as our preferred benchmark specification. In 
addition, we report models that include individual-level control variables 
unaffected by the treatment, namely, age and gender. In the supplementary 
information, we perform sensitivity analyses, estimating models where covari-
ates are gradually and randomly added to our models. Figure 11 in the supple-
mentary material presents the average estimated effects and standard errors 
randomly drawing one to 10 number of covariates, 1,000 times each, which 
buttresses our reported effect sizes and uncertainty levels.
The estimation of standard errors merits discussion. As is widely known, 
OLS tends to underestimate the true standard errors when errors are corre-
lated within a cluster. The common approach to tackle this problem is to 
apply sandwich estimators, which permit for the errors to be heteroskedastic 
and also to be correlated within clusters. Problematically, these estimators are 
only correct when the number of clusters approach infinity. The present 
study, however, only has 16 clusters. To bridge this problem, a recent influ-
ential study by Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2008) proposes the use of 
wild cluster bootstrap t procedures to estimate the standard errors. Using 
Monte Carlo simulations, the authors show that this procedure performs sig-
nificantly better even when the number of clusters is less than 10. In this 
article, I therefore apply their method to estimate standard errors. We cor-
roborate effect sizes and uncertainty levels using cluster randomization infer-
ence in Figures 9 and 10 in the supplementary material.
Obedience
Our first hypothesis states that Protestant missionaries increase obedience to 
both state and church authorities. In Figure 3a, we report the results of our 
obedience experiment. Villages exposed to Protestant missionaries are shaped 
by systematically higher levels of obedience. The treatment effect is not dis-
cernible among the mainline Evangelical Adventist church. However, the 
Pentecostal churches (Peruana and Maranatha) who propagate a particularly 
strict interpretation of and alignment with religious scripture lead to distinctly 
higher levels of obedience. Indeed, in the combined sample (left plot of 
Figure 3), respondents in Pentecostal villages were 19% more likely to leave 
the situation when informed that authorities demanded to do so. The results 
are also robust to the inclusion of individual-level covariates (circle), and 
hold across state and church authorities. The effects, though estimated with 
significant variability due to the low number of clusters, are unusually large 
in size. They highlight the profound effects missionaries exhibit in local com-
munities. In Table 8 in the supplementary material, we report the outcome 
measures across the treatment statuses to facilitate the interpretation of 
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substantive effect sizes. As can be seen, in control villages, 18% obeyed the 
authority figure as compared with 33% and 36% in the Peruana and Maranatha 
villages, respectively.
The same result emerges when scrutinizing the attitudinal measure. In 
Figure 3b, we report the results from the question regarding the acceptance of 
wrongdoings by authority figures. As can be seen, acceptance of wrongdo-
ings is positively correlated with the presence of a Protestant mission. Again, 
the treatment effect is most pronounced for Pentecostal missions. Here, the 
likelihood to accept wrongdoings is roughly 24% higher as compares with 
Control villages, which have not received a mission post. Mean outcome 
Figure 3. Obedience results.
The figures plot point estimates (dot/square) and 95% confidence intervals (lines) of 
regressions of the four treatments on the indicated outcomes of the obedience measures. 
Dots represent regressions with covariate adjustment, squares represent regressions without 
covariate adjustment (age and gender). Standard errors estimated using wild cluster bootstrap 
t procedure.
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values, reported in Table 8 in the supplementary material, highlight that 10% 
in control villages accept wrongdoings as compared with 33% and 30% in 
Peruana and Maranatha villages, respectively. The large treatment effects 
thus corroborate the effect sizes found in the experiment.
Persuadability
Our second hypothesis states that Protestant missionaries reduce persuad-
ability with regard to topics of secular interest. In Figure 4b, we report the 
results of the persuasion experiment. Villages exposed to Protestant mission-
aries are, overall, shaped by lower levels of persuadability. Interestingly, the 
mainline Adventist church yields a positive (insignificant) coefficient. The 
Figure 4. Persuasion results.
The figures plot point estimates (dot/square) and 95% confidence intervals (lines) of 
regressions of the four treatments on the indicated outcomes of the obedience measures. 
Dots represent regressions with covariate adjustment, squares represent regressions without 
covariate adjustment (age and gender). Standard errors estimated using wild cluster bootstrap 
t procedure.
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three remaining treatment statues, particularly the strict Pentecostal villages, 
display distinctly lower levels of persuadability. The effect is particularly 
pronounced for the Maranatha church—the strictest mission in the sample. 
Again, the pattern is similar across respondents primed with state or church 
authorities. Somewhat surprisingly, persuadability regarding secular topics 
seems less pronounced for respondents primed with church authorities. We 
should note, however, that the differences between estimates are not them-
selves statistically significant. Notwithstanding, the results show a pattern 
that religion leaves respondents (only roughly 50% of which have been pros-
elytized) less persuadable with regard to topics of secular importance such as 
social spending. Although estimated with significant variability, these effects 
are, again, sizable in scope: Pentecostal mission reduces persuadability by as 
much as 10%. The estimates are also highly similar across models where 
individual-level covariates are included. When looking at means across the 
treatment statues (Table 8 in the supplementary material), 13% of individuals 
in control villages are persuaded during the experiment compared with 8% 
and 3% in the Peruana and Maranatha villages, respectively.
The attitudinal measures (Figure 4b) yield a somewhat ambiguous pattern. 
Most coefficients are close to zero. One notable exception is Adventist vil-
lages, which display markedly less interest in village projects. Qualitatively 
speaking, this may be due to the fact that Adventist villages have high con-
version rates (see Table 7 in the supplementary material). Moreover, the 
author witnessed these villages as particularly homogeneous. Indeed, because 
the Adventist church is less other-worldly than its Pentecostal counterparts, it 
seems to have taken a more thorough stance in improving the livelihoods in 
a given village. Overall, however, the results taken together showcase that the 
attitudinal measures did not produce significant variation, and are estimated 
with high variability. This substantive conclusion also becomes apparent 
when looking at means of the attitudinal outcome measures across the treat-
ment statuses (Table 8 in the supplementary material). On average, individu-
als mention roughly one project across all treatment statuses.
Subset of Converts
Thus far, the analyses have scrutinized the effects of missionaries for the entire 
sample. A similarly interesting question, however, is what effects missionaries 
exhibit on converts. For this reason, in Figures 7 and 8 in the supplementary 
material, we conduct the same analyses for the subset of converts. Not surpris-
ingly, the results consistently gain in strength when focusing on proselytized 
individuals. The results thus confirm our theoretical intuition that the mission-
aries exhibit the most pronounced psychological effects for those that attend 
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the church. In addition, the coefficients from these models are estimated with 
less variability given that the sample is more homogeneous.
Qualitative Analysis
In addition to the experimental and attitudinal evidence, we conducted quali-
tative, semistructured interviews with all community presidents and one mis-
sionary in case a community was treated. The interviews were conducted 6 
months after the initial surveying activities to cross-check the causal esti-
mates and to provide a means to integrate the cross-case evidence with the 
qualitative information.12
In line with our quantitative findings, the qualitative interviews with vil-
lage presidents confirmed that control communities have witnessed little 
behavioral change. When asked what had changed in recent years—perhaps 
due to the religion of the village—all three presidents of Control villages 
could not think of any significant differences. One president simply stated, 
“nothing really.” Inquiring about obedience, all three Control presidents con-
firmed that residents in their villages were critical of authority figures. A 
president from a different Control village stated, “we are witnessing that the 
community is not taking the government seriously.”
In the Evangelized villages, this picture was reversed. While Adventist 
presidents discerned only mild behavioral changes, presidents in the Mixed 
and Pentecostal villages overwhelmingly noted significant behavior changes. 
Two trends stood out. First, presidents stated that the residents worked harder 
since being proselytized. Second, presidents noted that residents consumed 
less alcohol. One Peruana president stated, “The behavior of people has 
changed. In the past, they used to drink; now they only drink at times.” The 
rise of obedience was also acknowledged, and several presidents linked it 
directly to the charisma of the pastors. As one president noted, “we simply 
obey the church, and the pastor gives us his opinion.”
The qualitative interviews with preachers in treated villages buttressed 
these patterns. However, one should use this evidence with caution as pastors 
are not objective analysts of behavior changes due to the advent of a mission. 
Notwithstanding, with regard to the psychological mechanisms, every single 
interviewed pastor singled out obedience as a quintessential factor of their 
mission. For example, one pastor argued that obedience is a key Protestant 
trait: “yes, the bible teaches us to be correct and understand, and to lead our 
lives in faith.” Another stated, “obedience guides us on our way to truth.”
To assess potential biases in the assessment of village presidents about the 
causal process between missionaries and state authorities, we added four 
questions to the history expert interviews. These data, reported in Table 9 in 
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the supplementary material, show that the presidents are likely similarly 
objective and knowledgeable across treatment statuses. Specifically, average 
tenure of the presidents ranges from 18 months (Adventist villages) to 22 
months (Maranatha and Catholic). The number of village assemblies where 
presidents discuss communal matters, too, is equal across all treatment condi-
tions, namely, 12 per year. The relation between presidents and the village, 
assessed on a scale from 1 (very poor) to 10 (excellent), differs across treat-
ment statuses, but not in a way that would be predicted by the assignment to 
treatment. In particular, the history experts rated the relation as 8.3 in Catholic 
villages, 4.3 in Adventist villages, 9.3 in Mixed villages, 10.0 in Peruana vil-
lages, and 6.2 in Maranatha villages. Finally, and interestingly, the relation 
between the presidents and converts, assessed on the same 10-point scale, 
was stated to be rather poor. In the mixed and Peruana villages, it was at 1.0, 
while the experts gauged it at 4.4 and 3.2 in Mixed and Maranatha villages, 
respectively. Taken together, we interpret the qualitative information about 
village presidents by history experts such that causal estimates from presi-
dents about missionaries do not suffer from explicit biases.
Integration
To integrate the evidence from the qualitative interviews with the quantitative 
evidence, we use Bayesian Integration of Qualitative and Quantitative Data 
(BIQQ)—a new method proposed by Humphreys and Jacobs (2015). BIQQ 
allows researchers to draw integrated inferences from correlational (cross-
case) and process-level (within-case) observations. The framework relies on 
the potential outcomes framework popularized by Rubin (1974).
Let the treatment, X, be the exposure of a village to a Protestant mission. 
Let the outcome, Y, be obedience or persuadability. Because treatment is 
assigned at the village level, in this section, we aggregate the experimental 
outcomes at the village level. To reduce complexity of causal types (Humphreys 
& Jacobs, 2015, p. 662), we dichotomize the aggregated outcomes. In particu-
lar, we code a village as “obedient” (or “non-persuadable”)13 when the village-
level mean is above (below) the population-level mean. This approach is 
rather punishing, biasing our integrated inferences downward. The resulting 
aggregated outcomes for the villages are given in Table 4.
In accordance with Rubin (1974), there are four potential types of villages, 
reported in Table 5. Adverse villages are those where inhabitants become 
obedient (non-persuadable) when not treated and disobedient (persuadable) 
when treated (Type a). Beneficial villages are those where inhabitants become 
obedient (non-persuadable) when treated and disobedient (persuadable) 
when not treated (Type b). Chronic villages are those where inhabitants 
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become disobedient (persuadable) whether treated or not treated (Type c). 
Finally, destined villages are those where inhabitants become obedient (non-
persuadable) whether treated or not treated (Type d).
When testing our hypotheses that Protestant missionaries increase obedi-
ence and reduce persuadability, we want to estimate the share of beneficial 
types in the population, that is, the share of villages that turn obedient (non-
persuadable) if and only if there is a Protestant mission. The average causal 
effect is, hence, b a− . As Table 5 demonstrates, the fundamental problem of 
causal inference is that one can only observe the outcome and the treatment 
status, but not the type. A researcher observing change is thus uncertain 
whether citizens in a village turned obedient (non-persuadable) because of 
the mission (Type b), or whether such change would have occurred regardless 
(Type d).
In traditional quantitative cross-case estimation, researchers do away with 
this problem by ruling out destined types (monotonicity). An alternate 
approach is to leverage fine-grained local-level evidence in determining the 
type of a case. Such process-tracing allows researchers to draw “causal infer-
ences from diagnostic pieces of evidence” with regard to one single case 
(Collier, 2011, p. 824). Process-tracing, in a word, attempts to determine the 
type of a given case by observing the underlying causal process. Traditionally, 
process-tracing and cross-case estimation have been conducted separately. 
The BIQQ framework, however, allows one to combine both approaches. 
Specifically, BIQQ uses the variable K  to depict the outcome of the process 
Table 4. Quantitative Evidence Aggregated at Village Level.
Obedience Y = 0  (Disobedient) Y =1  (Obedient)
X = 0  (Not evangelized)  2 1
X =1  (Evangelized)  9 4
Persuasion Y = 0  (Persuadable) Y =1  (Nonpersuadable)
X = 0  (Not evangelized)  3 0
X =1  (Evangelized) 12 1
Table 5. Types of Villages.
Y = 0 Y =1
X = 0 beneficial; chronic adverse; destined
X =1 adverse; chronic beneficial; destined
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tracing. K =1  indicates that a clue is searched for and found. Here, the 
researcher gained evidence that a village is beneficial, for example, it turned 
obedient (non-persuadable) because of a Protestant mission. K = 0  indicates 
that a clue is searched for and not found. Here, the researcher gained evidence 
that the village is a destined type.
To implement such integration, we concluded the above semistructured 
qualitative interviews by quantifying the causal “clues” contained therein 
using two structured questions: “Do you think people in this village have 
become more obedient to state authorities [less interested in secular topics] 
because of religion?” Note that we did not inquire about church authorities to 
avoid placing village presidents in an uncomfortable situation given that 
many are part of the mission. If village presidents said “yes,” they character-
ized the village as beneficial. If they said “no,” they saw no causal relation 
between the two variables.
The results of the two questions are given in Table 6. Most presidents in 
treated villages deemed their village as beneficial (12 individuals), while 
only one president deemed it destined (i.e., did not confirm a causal link 
between Protestant missionaries and obedience). The same picture emerges 
regrading persuasion. Ten presidents confirmed a causal link between 
Protestant missionaries and less concern for secular topics. Two presidents 
did not confirm such a link. The three presidents in non-proselytized villages 
gave a isomorphic picture across the two outcomes: Two saw no causal link 
between religion and obedience/persuadability, while one in each village did.
With both pieces of evidence at hand—cross-case evidence yielded from 
the two experiments, and within-case evidence from village presidents—
BIQQ adopts a Bayesian framework to provide one unified causal estimate. 
To do so, three assumptions must be spelled out.
First, one must characterize priors on the distribution of causal types in the 
population. They are described by λ λ λ λ λ= ( , , , )a b c d .14 Here, we use flat priors 
for λa, λc, and λd. We let the prior for λb  range from uninformative (i.e., 1) to 
Table 6. Qualitative Clues.
Obedience Y = 0 Y =1 Persuasion Y = 0 Y =1
X = 0
K = 0 2 0 K = 0 2 0
K = 1 1 0 K = 1 1 0
X =1
 K = 0 1 0 K = 0 2 1
 K = 1 4 8 K = 1 3 7
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20. Thus, λObedience x= (1, ,1,1)  and λPersuadability x= (1, ,1,1) , where x∈[1, 20]. As 
such, the analysis allows one to interpret the evidence for different priors over 
b types. Second, one must characterize priors on the treatment assignment 
probabilities for each village type, described by π = (πa, πb, πc, πd). Here, too, 
we use flat priors. Third, one must characterize the probability of observing a 
clue for a given village type, j , under the two different treatment statuses 
( )X X=1; = 0 , which we label φ φ= jx. These priors express the likelihood of 
gathering evidence. We believe that the likelihood to pick up clues does not 
differ meaningfully across treatment statuses, given that all presidents agreed 
to give interviews. In line with Humphreys and Jacobs (2015, p. 664), we hence 
incorporate flat over φ.
Overall, these three parameters yield θ λ pi φ= ( , , ), which characterizes the 
nuts and bolts of the BIQQ framework.15 In a final step, we then specify a 
likelihood function. Here, we adopt the following function:16
Pr D n n k w n k wXY XY XYK XYK| = | , | ,* *θ( ) −( )× ( )Multinom Multinom . (2)
Figure 5 shows the results of the integrated inference of the two sources of 
evidence. In particular, the graph shows the estimated treatment effect under 
different priors for λb. Higher values for λ  represent certainty that all vil-
lages are b types, and vice versa. The integration buttresses the quantitative 
point estimates. Indeed, the treatment effect goes as high as 50% for reason-
ably high levels of λb. We should note, however, that almost all presidents in 
Evangelized villages confirmed that citizens had become more obedient.
Discussion and Conclusion
This article has brought theoretical considerations and empirical evidence to 
a long-standing question: whether religious groups undermine political 
authority. Exploring the case of Protestant missionaries, we argued that they 
affect political authority via two psychological mechanisms. First, the advent 
of the Protestant belief system, which prizes the supernatural and exposes 
converts to charismatic preachers, increases obedience to authority. Second, 
Protestantisms’ focus on the afterlife coupled with its “political apathy” 
reduces converts’ propensity to be persuaded by political authorities. The 
psychological effect of Protestant missionaries on political authority is thus 
ambiguous.
Before recommending avenues for future research, two words of caution 
are in order. First, this article has primarily relied on experimental measures 
of obedience and persuadability. While experiments offer a good way to mea-
sure behavior in a realistic manner, missionaries could have have affected 
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how respondents respond to researchers. To alleviate such concerns, our 
experimental measures were unobtrusive in nature. Thus, while averages 
may have been different across villages, treatment effects, as a result of small 
experimental primes, are unlikely to have differed across treatment statuses. 
Moreover, enumerators did not notice different attitudes toward researchers 
across treatment statuses, and research permits were granted in all selected 
villages.
Second, we have argued that the assignment to treatment in our sample 
was as-if random due to the unexpected withdrawal of the Maoist rebels. 
Every attempt was made to solidify this assumption. Qualitative interviews 
with missionaries, village presidents, and history experts revealed that no one 
had a clear answer as to why a given community was chosen by a missionary 
group. Detailed balance checks using pretreatment census data support this 
claim. Nonetheless, selection may have occurred in unobserved ways. It may, 
for instance, be the case that missionaries chose particularly obedient (non-
persuadable) communities. Indeed, at first glance, obedient individuals are a 
likely target for Protestant missionaries. Yet, we also showed the persuad-
ability was significantly lower, which should work to decrease the effect of 
Protestant proselytism. More importantly, the missions in our sample have 
the declared aim to empower the people theologically. It is their intention to 
Figure 5. Integrated inference—Sensitivity of λb .
The two figures plot the integrated treatment effect under different priors for λb  (x axis). 
Dots represent the estimates, the lines represent 95% highest density intervals. For the 
quantitative experimental measures, we collapsed state and church endorsers.
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spark people to engage with the scripture, and to share and teach beliefs in a 
vertical manner. Given these calculi, it therefore seems unlikely that Protestant 
missionaries would pick communities that are particularly obedient. 
Obedience is conducive to hierarchical structures, to uncritical engagement 
with authority—both factors would make it less likely for missions to treat 
particularly obedient communities.
Having discussed these caveats, we believe that our findings have three 
broad implications for the study of religion and politics. First, our evidence 
shows that the relation between religion and politics may be determined as 
much by individual-level psychological mechanisms as by group-level struc-
tural factors. Religious institutions, and missionaries in particular, affect indi-
viduals’ cognition and behavior. They shape how individuals relate to 
authority figures, and what topics they take interest in. We hope that by 
underlining the importance of individual-level psychological processes, this 
study may motivate future researchers to take the cognitive effects of religion 
more seriously, and to explore it in other contexts.
Second and related, this article has demonstrated that religion’s psycho-
logical effects are as much the product of ideas as they are of hard-wired 
institutions. While missionaries do add new local-level institutions that shape 
political authority—notably, church buildings—we found that Pentecostal 
missions exhibit consistently more pronounced effects than their Evangelical 
counterparts. This is surprising given that Pentecostal and mainline 
Evangelical missions do not differ on a host of dimensions save their theo-
logical strictness. The evidence, thus, shows that religious teachings and 
ideas shape society more than some institutionally minded scholars have one 
believe. The very notion that “ideas matter” is thus a fruitful avenue for future 
research. Above all, future accounts may find it useful to analyze sermons—a 
task that was beyond the scope of this study.
Third, the present research project exclusively focused on Protestant mis-
sionaries, assessing psychological mechanisms. Further research that more 
fully maps the relation between religion and authority, perhaps at a macro-
level, is therefore the logical next step. For example, the present project did 
not assess the manner in which religious and state authorities interact. 
Interestingly, two village presidents in the present study lamented that church 
leaders and ministers had gained increasing influence. Other village presi-
dents became part of the mission and used the religious networks to their 
advantage. This anecdotal evidence demonstrates the intricacies at play in the 
relationship between religious and state authorities—which may help explain 
why a century-old question continues to spark the interest of social scientists 
and theologians alike.
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Notes
 1. For example, in his Letter Concerning Toleration, John Locke goes to great 
lengths to point out that religious groups are voluntary organizations, which have 
no right to use coercive power over their own members or those outside their 
group. Modern political theorists share Locke’s skepticism toward religion in 
the political sphere. Perhaps most vigorously, John Rawls (1993) demanded that 
societies “take the truths of religion off the political agenda” (p. 151).
 2. Since the pioneering study by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, and 
Sanford (1950), political scientists and psychologists have recently taken an 
increasing interest in the topic of authority. See, for example, Altemeyer (1998); 
Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003); Feldman (2003); Stenner (2005); 
Graham, Haidt, and Nosek (2009); and Hetherington and Suhay (2011).
 3. Own translation based on the German original: “Aufs erste müssen wir das 
weltliche Recht und Schwert gut begründen.”
 4. Persuasion arguably is a quintessential facet of religion (Weithman, 2002). This 
holds particularly true for conversionary Protestantism (Meyer, 2010). Not sur-
prisingly, some of the most vigorous debates among Protestant thinkers revolve 
around the topic (Bayle, 2005). A particularly contested passage is found in the 
New Testament. In the Gospel of Luke, for instance, Jesus tells his disciples: “Go 
out to the roads and country lanes and compel them to come in, so that my house 
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will be full” (Luke 14:23). This very notion of “compulsion” laid the ground-
work for Christian missionary efforts around the globe.
5. The qualitative interviews, including all quotes, are available in the supplemen-
tary material.
6. For detailed analyses regarding the Catholic Church’s decline in Latin America, 
see Stoll (1990) and Gill (2008).
7. Only 1.4% of 1,024 survey respondents belong to no church. Similarly, 95.4% of 
the sample pray regularly.
8. In the supplementary material, we provide transcripts of recorded sermons in all 
villages that buttress the descriptions in this section.
9. In one village, 18 converts belonged to a small mission called Israelita, which is 
comparable with the Adventists in theological fervor.
10. In particular, the research team divided each village into four equally sized 
blocks. In each block, the surveyors randomly determined which road to follow. 
Individuals on each road were drawn using a detailed randomization dictionary, 
which randomly determined the next respondent’s houses number, gender, and 
age-bracket. The age-brackets reflected the recent Peruvian census, leading to a 
rather young sample with 50% below the age of 38.
11. Enumerators were instructed to randomize the order of the question. However, 
they were not given an exact predetermined time frame. This decision was taken 
to lighten the burden of the enumerators, who had to implement many different 
randomizations already.
12. All qualitative interviews are available upon request from the authors.
13. Note that by obedient (persuadable), we mean more obedient (persuadable) than 
the average population. Without loss of generality and to make the following 
analysis seamless, we conceptualize “non-persuadable” as the positive causal 
outcome.
14. Note that Bayesian Integration of Qualitative and Quantitative Data (BIQQ) 
implicitly invokes a stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA) assumption.
15. BIQQ also allows one to characterize uncertainty over θ, using a prior prob-
ability distribution over these parameters. For simplicity and because the deci-
sion to use BIQQ was taken after the data were collected, we claim to be certain 
about all three parameters. Realistically, however, the parameters associated with 
meaningful uncertainty are  pi and λ. For this reason, we run sensitivity analyses.
16. See supplementary material for details regarding the likelihood function.
References
Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The 
authoritarian personality. New York, NY: Harpers.
Altemeyer, B. (1998). The other “authoritarian personality.” Advances in Experimental 
Social Psychology, 30, 47-92.
Anderson, A. H. (2013). An introduction to Pentecostalism: Global charismatic 
Christianity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Rink 509
Audi, R. (2000). Religious commitment and secular reason. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.
Baker, J. W. (1985). Sola fide, sola gratia: The battle for Luther in seventeenth-cen-
tury England. The Sixteenth Century Journal, 16, 115-133.
Baldassarri, D., & Grossman, G. (2011). Centralized sanctioning and legitimate 
authority promote cooperation in humans. Proceedings of the National Academy 
of Sciences, 108, 11023-11027.
Barreda, P. (1993). Evidencias de un nuevo protestantismo: El caso de la Iglesia 
Evangélica Peruana [Evidence of a new Protestantism: The case of the Iglesia 
Evangélica Peruana]. Cristianismo y Sociedad, 115, 57-81.
Barro, R. J. (1999). Determinants of democracy. Journal of Political Economy, 
107(Suppl. 6), S158-S183.
Bayle, P. (2005). A philosophical commentary on these words of the gospel, Luke 
14:23, “compel them to come in, that my house may be full.” Indianapolis, IN: 
Liberty Fund.
Berman, E. (2000). Sect, subsidy, and sacrifice: An economist’s view of Ultra-
Orthodox Jews. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 905-953.
Birch, B., Rasmussen, L. L., & Wogaman, J. P. (1989). Bible and ethics in the 
Christian life. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press.
Blau, P. M. (1963). Critical remarks on Weber’s theory of authority. American 
Political Science Review, 57, 305-316.
Blum, U., & Dudley, L. (2001). Religion and economic growth: Was Weber right? 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 11, 207-230.
Cadorette, C. (1994). The deconstruction of Peru: Social chaos as Ecclesial Kairos. 
Missiology: An International Review, 22, 177-186.
Cameron, A. C., Gelbach, J. B., & Miller, D. L. (2008). Bootstrap-based improve-
ments for inference with clustered errors. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
90, 414-427.
Casanova, J. (2011). Public religions in the modern world. Chicago, IL: University 
of Chicago Press.
Cialdini, R. B., & Goldstein, N. J. (2004). Social influence: Compliance and confor-
mity. Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 591-621.
Cobb, M. D., & Kuklinski, J. H. (1997). Changing minds: Political arguments and 
political persuasion. American Journal of Political Science, 41, 88-121.
Collier, D. (2011). Understanding process tracing. Political Science and Politics, 44, 
823-830.
Crane, W. H. (1965). Mission and radical obedience. International Review of Mission, 
54, 325-334.
Dalton, R. J. (2008). Citizenship norms and the expansion of political participation. 
Political Studies, 56, 76-98.
De Grazia, S. (1959). What authority is not. The American Political Science Review, 
53, 321-331.
De Kwaadsteniet, E. W., & Van Dijk, E. (2010). Social status as a cue for tacit coor-
dination. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 515-524.
510 Comparative Political Studies 51(4)
Deiros, P. A. (1991). Protestant fundamentalism in Latin America. In M. E. Marty 
& R. S. Appleby (Eds.), Fundamentalisms observed (pp. 142-197). Chicago, IL: 
University of Chicago Press.
del Pino, P. (1996). Tiempos de guerra y de dioses: ronderos, evangélicos y senderis-
tas en el valle del Rio Apurimac [Times of war and gods: Ronderos, evangelicals 
and rebels in the valley of the Rio Apurimac]. In C. I. Degregori (Ed.), Las ron-
das campesinas y la derrota de Sendero Luminoso [The peasant ronderos and the 
defeat of the Sendero Luminoso]. IEP.
Elwert, F. (2013). Graphical causal models. In M. L. Stephen (Ed.), Handbook of 
causal analysis for social research (pp. 245-273). New York, NY: Springer.
Escobar, S. (1986). Transformation in Ayacucho: From violence to peace and hope. 
Transformation: An International Journal of Holistic Mission Studies, 3, 9-13.
Feldman, S. (2003). Enforcing social conformity: A theory of authoritarianism. 
Political Psychology, 24, 41-74.
Ferguson, M. (2005). Evangelical religion and social instability in Southern highland 
Peru (Doctoral thesis). Retrieved from http://www.indigenouspolicy.org/index.
php/ipj/thesis/view/30
Freston, P. (2008). Evangelical Christianity and democracy in Latin America. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press.
Garrard-Burnett, V., & Stoll, D. (1993). Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America. 
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Garsten, B. (2009). Saving persuasion: A defense of rhetoric and judgment. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Gill, A. J. (1994). Rendering unto Caesar? Religious competition and Catholic politi-
cal strategy in Latin America, 1962-79. American Journal of Political Science, 
38, 403-425.
Gill, A. J. (2001). Religion and comparative politics. Annual Review of Political 
Science, 4, 117-138.
Gill, A. J. (2004). Weber in Latin America: Is Protestant growth enabling the consoli-
dation of democratic capitalism? Democratization, 11, 42-65.
Gill, A. J. (2008). Rendering unto Caesar: The Catholic church and the state in Latin 
America. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. A. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on dif-
ferent sets of moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
96, 1029-1046.
Grossman, G. (2015). Renewalist Christianity and the political saliency of LGBTs: 
Theory and evidence from Sub-Saharan Africa. The Journal of Politics, 77, 337-
351.
Grzymala-Busse, A. (2012). Why comparative politics should take religion (more) 
seriously. Annual Review of Political Science, 15, 421-442.
Habermas, J. (2006). Religion in the public sphere. European Journal of Philosophy, 
14, 1-25.
Hetherington, M., & Suhay, E. (2011). Authoritarianism, threat, and Americans sup-
port for the war on terror. American Journal of Political Science, 55, 546-560.
Rink 511
Huber, J. D., & Stanig, P. (2011). Church-state separation and redistribution. Journal 
of Public Economics, 95, 828-836.
Humphreys, M., & Jacobs, A. M. (2015). Mixing methods: A Bayesian approach. 
American Political Science Review, 109, 653-673.
Ireland, R. (1993). The crentes of campo alegre and the religious construction 
of Brazilian politics. In V. Garrard-Burnett & D. Stoll (Eds.), Rethinking 
Protestantism in Latin America (pp. 20-45). Philadelphia, PA: Temple University 
Press.
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conserva-
tism as motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 339-375.
Klaiber, J. (1988). The church, dictatorships, and democracy in Latin America. 
Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books.
Lankina, T., & Getachew, L. (2013). Competitive religious entrepreneurs: Christian 
missionaries and female education in colonial and post-colonial India. British 
Journal of Political Science, 43, 103-131.
Luther, M. (1967). Von weltlicher Obrigkeit, wie man ihr Gehorsam schuldig sei [Of 
secular authority, how to be obedient]. In O. Clemen (Ed.), Luthers Werke in 
Auswahl [A selection of Luther’s works]. Berlin, Germany: Walter de Gruyter.
March, A. F. (2013). Rethinking religious reasons in public justification. American 
Political Science Review, 107, 523-539.
Marshall, R. (2009). Political spiritualities: The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria. 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Mayo, H. B. (1962). How can we justify democracy? American Political Science 
Review, 56, 555-566.
McClendon, G., & Riedl, R. B. (2015). Religion as a stimulant of political participa-
tion: Experimental evidence from Nairobi, Kenya. The Journal of Politics, 77, 
1045-1057.
Meyer, B. (2004). Christianity in Africa: From African independent to Pentecostal-
charismatic churches. Annual Review of Anthropology, 33, 447-474.
Meyer, B. (2010). Aesthetics of persuasion: Global Christianity and Pentecostalism’s 
sensational forms. South Atlantic Quarterly, 109, 741-763.
Milgram, S. (1974). Obedience to authority. New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Nasr, S. V. R. (2001). Islamic leviathan: Islam and the making of state power. Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press.
Olson, E. (2006). Development, transnational religion, and the power of ideas in the 
High Provinces of Cusco, Peru. Environment and Planning A, 38, 885-902.
Pearl, J. (1995). Causal diagrams for empirical research. Biometrika, 82, 669-688.
Philpott, D. (2007). Explaining the political ambivalence of religion. American 
Political Science Review, 101, 505-525.
Poston, L. (1992). Islamic Dawah in the West: Muslim missionary activity and the 
dynamics of conversion to Islam. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Purzycki, B. G., Apicella, C., Atkinson, Q. D., Cohen, E., McNamara, R. A., Willard, 
A. K., . . . Henrich, J. (2016). Moralistic gods, supernatural punishment and the 
expansion of human sociality. Nature, 530, 327-330.
512 Comparative Political Studies 51(4)
Rawls, J. (1993). Political liberalism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
Redlawsk, D. P. (2002). Hot cognition or cool consideration? Testing the effects of 
motivated reasoning on political decision making. The Journal of Politics, 64, 
1021-1044.
Reuschling, W. C. (2005). “Trust and obey”: The danger of obedience as duty in 
evangelical ethics. Journal of the Society of Christian Ethics, 25(2), 59-77.
Rubin, D. B. (1974). Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and non-
randomized studies. Journal of Educational Psychology, 66, 688-701.
Sniderman, P. M., Brody, R. A., & Tetlock, P. E. (1993). Reasoning and choice: 
Explorations in political psychology. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press.
Sperber, E. (2014). Patron saints? Political incentives to promote religious change 
(Technical report). Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2415092
Stenner, K. (2005). The authoritarian dynamic. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.
Stepan, A. C. (2000). Religion, democracy, and the “twin tolerations.” Journal of 
Democracy, 11, 37-57.
Stern, S. J. (1998). Shining and other paths: War and society in Peru, 1980-1995. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Stoll, D. (1990). Is Latin America turning protestant? The politics of evangelical 
growth. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Strong, S. (1992). Shining path: Terror and revolution in Peru. New York, NY: 
Times Books.
Switzer, R. W., Jr. (1993). Sendero Luminoso and Peruvian counterinsurgency 
(Doctoral thesis). Retrieved from http://etd.lsu.edu/docs/available/etd-01242007-
200500/unrestricted/russswitzerthesis.pdf
Taber, C. S., Cann, D., & Kucsova, S. (2009). The motivated processing of political 
arguments. Political Behavior, 31, 137-155.
Tirole, J., & Bénabou, R. (2006). Belief in just world and redistributive politics. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121, 699-746.
Tusalem, R. F. (2009). The role of Protestantism in democratic consolidation among 
transitional states. Comparative Political Studies, 42, 882-915.
Tyler, T. R. (1997). The psychology of legitimacy: A relational perspective on vol-
untary deference to authorities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1, 
323-345.
Tyler, T. R. (2006). Psychological perspectives on legitimacy and legitimation. 
Annual Review of Psychology, 57, 375-400.
Webber, R. (1978). Common roots: A call to evangelical maturity. Grand Rapids, MI: 
Zondervan Publishing House.
Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society: An outline of interpretive sociology. 
Berkeley: University of California Press.
Weber, M. (2009). The theory of social and economic organization. New York, NY: 
Simon & Schuster.
Weithman, P. J. (2002). Religion and the obligations of citizenship. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.
Rink 513
Witte, J. (2002). Law and Protestantism: The legal teachings of the Lutheran refor-
mation. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Woodberry, R. D. (2012). The missionary roots of liberal democracy. American 
Political Science Review, 106, 244-274.
Wulff, D. M. (1991). Psychology of religion: Classic and contemporary views. 
Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley.
Zaller, J. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press.
Author Biography
Anselm Rink is a PhD candidate in political science, in the Department of Political 
Science, Columbia University, New York, USA. He is also a pre-doctoral fellow at 
the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin für Sozialforschung.
